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in the current paper, we first evaluate the suitability of traditional serial reaction time (srt) and 
artificial grammar learning (Agl) experiments for measuring implicit learning of social signals.  
We then report the results of a novel sequence learning task which combines aspects of the srt 
and Agl paradigms to meet our suggested criteria for how implicit learning experiments can be 
adapted to increase their relevance to situations of social intuition. the sequences followed stan- 
dard finite-state grammars. sequence learning and consciousness of acquired knowledge were 
compared between 2 groups of 24 participants viewing either sequences of individually presented 
letters or sequences of body-posture pictures, which were described as series of yoga movements. 
Participants in both conditions showed above-chance classification accuracy, indicating that se-
quence learning had occurred in both stimulus conditions. this shows that sequence learning can 
still be found when learning procedures reflect the characteristics of social intuition. rule aware-
ness was measured using trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy (dienes & scott, 2005; scott 
& dienes, 2008). For letters, sequence classification was best on trials where participants reported 
responding on the basis of explicit rules or memory, indicating some explicit learning in this con-
dition. For body-posture, classification was not above chance on these types of trial, but instead 
showed a trend to be best on those trials where participants reported that their responses were 
based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice, suggesting that learning was more implicit.  
results therefore indicate that the use of traditional stimuli in research on sequence learning might 
underestimate the extent to which learning is implicit in domains such as social learning, contri- 
buting to ongoing debate about levels of conscious awareness in implicit learning.
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IntroductIon
Implicit learning is assumed to play a central role in various everyday 
behaviours. One example is the learning of complex patterns of mo-
tor responses involved in skills like playing musical instruments and 
driving, in which the details of the acquired knowledge are not fully 
accessible to conscious awareness (Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998). 
Another example is the acquisition of grammatical rules of one’s na-
tive language, which is claimed to occur largely independently of the 
conscious intent of the learner (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 
1998; Reber, 1967, 1989). Yet another category of everyday behaviours 
explained in terms of implicit learning is the encoding and decoding 
of social signals in social interactions (Lieberman, 2000). For example, 
when people are sometimes able to accurately judge the personality 
of another person without being able to verbalize what the judgement 
was based on, this may be explained in terms of complex behavioural 
regularities being learned without full conscious awareness (Lewicki, AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Hill,  &  Czyzewska,  1992).  Because  of  its  assumed  central  role  in 
social cognition, implicit learning has even been referred to as the 
cognitive substrate of social intuition (Lieberman, 2000). According 
to  Lieberman,  social  intuition  involves  making  rapid  judgements 
about  the  emotions,  personality,  intentions,  attitudes,  and  skills  of 
others (p. 111). Such judgements are often based on the perception 
of  sequences  of  various  forms  of  nonverbal  cues,  including  subtle 
facial expressions, body postures, and nonverbal gestures. Lieberman 
refers  to  this  process  as  the  “learning  of  nonverbal  decoding.” 
This  is  regarded  as  an  acquired  ability  that  develops  continuously 
throughout the life span.
The two most widely used implicit learning paradigms are prima-
rily related to studying the first two of the above-mentioned areas of 
implicit learning: motor skill learning and language learning. In the 
serial reaction time (SRT) task, participants are first trained to make 
fast motor responses to indicate the shifting location of a target that 
moves between a fixed number of positions on a computer screen ac-
cording to a complex repeating structure (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). 
Learning is then measured in terms of reaction time (RT) increase 
when  the  sequence  is  violated.  In  the  artificial  grammar  learning 
(AGL) task, participants are first presented with a series of letter strings 
in which the order of letters is, unbeknown to participants, governed 
by a complex finite-state grammar (Reber, 1967). In a subsequent test 
phase, participants are informed of the existence of a grammar, and 
asked to classify whether each of a series of novel letter strings follows 
this grammar or violates it. 
These SRT and AGL paradigms have been modified to further 
increase  their  relevance  and  generalizability  to  everyday  learning 
situations. For example, Witt and Willingham (2006) studied sequence 
learning  for  action  sequences  where  responding  to  different  target 
positions  required  different  types  of  action  (i.e.,  pressing,  turning, 
pinching, or switching). The aim of this study was to address whether 
everyday action learning of, for instance, sequences of dance or martial 
arts movements, could be learned implicitly. The results supported 
the claim that learning of such sequences could indeed be associated 
with less than fully explicit learning. Similarly, Verwey’s (1994) discrete 
sequence production task has similarities to everyday implicit learn-
ing by virtue of involving extended practice over multiple test sessions. 
As an example of how AGL tasks may be applied to everyday learning 
contexts,  Pacton,  Perruchet,  Fayol,  and  Cleeremans  (2001)  studied 
principles for natural language learning in children using methodo-
logical principles from AGL research in order to test whether children 
acquired knowledge of abstract rules. 
In our view, it is less obvious how findings from standard SRT and 
AGL tasks can be applied to study the learning of nonverbal decod-
ing of social signals. However, if this form of social intuition is one of 
the main real-life phenomena thought to be guided by implicit learn-
ing, it is important to consider the extent to which standard implicit 
learning experiments are appropriate for studying this phenomenon. 
We therefore suggest some methodological criteria for increasing the 
relevance of implicit learning experiments to situations of social intui-
tion, and consider the extent to which the standard procedures used in 
SRT and AGL tasks meet these criteria. We then report an experiment 
which aimed to meet these methodological criteria. The real-world 
situation whose characteristics our experimental procedure attempts 
to reflect is the intuitive classification of different patterns of body   
movement. 
Increasing the relevance  
of implicit learning experiments  
to situations of social intuition
We present five methodological suggestions for increasing the rele-
vance of implicit learning experiments to situations of social intuition. 
After each suggestion, we briefly summarise the extent to which the 
requirement is already met by standard SRT and AGL procedures.
1. Learning shouLd invoLve exposure  
to stimuLus sequences that represent  
a dynamic event. 
Temporal sequences of events are considered to be a critical fac-
tor in perception of human body language. Drawing inferences about 
another person based on their body language is largely dependent on 
patterns of motion: “Bodies … are typically moving, and much of the 
information that bodies convey is in dynamic movement” (Slaughter, 
Stone, & Reed, 2004, p. 220). This is why it is easier to perceive gender, 
emotion, and direction of attention in a person that is moving com-
pared to a person in static position (Slaughter et al., 2004). Learning 
to infer these states from body movement therefore involves sequence 
learning in the sense of repeated exposure to temporal sequences of 
different body postures. 
The Srt task
In the SRT task, stimuli are indeed always presented in sequen- 
tial order.
The AGL task
This  is  not  necessarily  the  case  in  AGL  experiments  where 
stimuli  are  presented  simultaneously.  When  stimuli  are  letters  ar-
ranged in a string they may of course still be scanned sequentially 
since this is the way we read. However, sequential processing is less 
likely for picture stimuli that are not specifically arranged to encour-
age  sequential  scanning.  Little  is  known  about  the  relative  abili- 
ty to learn artificial grammars when nonverbal stimuli are employed 
which do not encourage sequential scanning to the same extent as   
letters.
2. the sequence shouLd invoLve different states 
of one entity rather than a series of different 
entities.
Nonverbal decoding of body movements, or for that matter facial 
expressions, involves observing changes in the state of a single entity 
which undergoes transformations in a sequential manner. The entity 
is the human body and the transformations are the movements and 
relative movements of the body parts (e.g., arms, legs, torso, etc.). AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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The Srt task 
In the traditional version of the SRT task, the sequence indeed in-
volves different states of the same entity, typically a geometrical shape 
(e.g., circle) that moves between different screen positions on different 
trials. However there are versions of the SRT task in which the sequence 
consists of different entities: In the category SRT task (Goschke & 
Bolte, 2007), participants respond to the identity of a series of different 
objects that are presented in random order, but the semantic categories 
of those objects follow a repeating sequence. A modified version of the 
SRT task where the colour and shape of the target vary randomly from 
trial to trial (Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 2007) could be seen as 
yet another example of a sequence consisting of different entities. 
 
The AGL task
In the traditional AGL task, each string of simultaneously-presen-
ted letters is an independent event (a new combination of letters) rather 
than a transformation of the string presented on the previous trial. 
3. Learning episodes shouLd consist of many 
separate exempLars of the sequentiaL  
reguLarity.
Learning of socially relevant behaviour patterns most often takes 
place over many separate episodes.
   
The Srt task 
Here the same sequence is usually repeated continuously within 
one  long  learning  block,  rather  than  as  separated  presentations  of 
sequences. 
 
The AGL task 
Here the letter strings, each of which is an exemplar of a “legal” 
sequence, are temporally distinct from each other.
4. repetition of exactLy the same sequences 
shouLd be minimized.
In everyday social interactions, examples of behaviour sequences 
that express the same emotion, motivation, or attitude will rarely be 
identical in every respect. In fact social intuition, defined in terms of 
implicit learning, is perhaps likely to be based on sequences that con-
tain some inter-sequence variation since learning is likely to become 
more explicit when discrete exemplars of a behavioural regularity are 
always identical.
 
The Srt task 
Standard  “deterministic”  SRT  sequences  do  not  contain  devia-
tions from the repeating sequence. However, in so-called probabilistic 
sequences the target violates the fixed sequence on a certain proportion 
of trials (Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998).
 
The AGL task 
The sequences are not exact repetitions since they are determined 
by a complex finite-state grammar. 
5. the task shouLd incLude precise measurement 
of what information participants are  
consciousLy aware of so that it is possibLe to 
discriminate between nonconscious impLicit 
Learning, sociaL intuition, and expLicit ruLe 
awareness.
Elsewhere (Norman, Price, & Duff, 2010; Price & Norman, 2008, 
2009) we have argued that in order to identify learning that is neither 
fully unconscious nor fully conscious, but instead falls into the interme-
diate zone of “intuition”, “cognitive feelings,” or “fringe consciousness”, 
objective performance measures need to be supplemented by various 
subjective awareness measures. Therefore, any implicit learning experi-
ment that aims to identify social intuition should include such measures.
 
The Srt and AGL tasks 
One  procedure  for  distinguishing  between  different  levels  of 
conscious  rule  awareness  in  implicit  learning  is  to  ask  for  confi-
dence  ratings  after  each  classification  response.  According  to  the 
zero-correlation  criterion,  learning  can  be  regarded  as  implicit   
when  confidence  is  unrelated  to  classification  accuracy  (Dienes, 
Altmann,  Kwan,  &  Goode,  1995).  This  procedure  has  been  ap- 
plied  both  to  SRT  experiments  (e.g.,  Norman  et  al.,  2007)  and  to 
AGL experiments (e.g., Dienes et al., 1995). An additional procedure 
that has been developed within AGL experiments (Dienes & Scott,   
2005;  Scott  &  Dienes,  2008)  but  that  has  also  been  applied  to   
SRT  experiments  (e.g.,  Fu,  Dienes,  &  Fu,  2009)  is  to  ask  partici- 
pants to report which decision strategy they used to arrive at their   
classification  of  a  test  sequence.  If  people  are  able  to  accurately   
classify  letter  strings  on  trials  where  they  report  that  their  clas- 
sification  was  based  on  explicit  memory  or  awareness  of  a  rule   
(i.e., explicit decision strategies), it is assumed that the participants 
had  conscious  structural  knowledge  of  the  rules  of  the  grammar   
on  these  trials  (Dienes  &  Scott,  2005).  If  people  are  able  to  accu-
rately  classify  letter  strings  on  trials  where  they  report  that  their 
decision was based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice (i.e., 
implicit decision strategies), it is assumed that structural knowledge 
was unconscious. This is the case even though participants may, on 
trials attributed to intuition or familiarity, have had conscious judge-
ment  knowledge  of  which  sequences  were  grammatical.  In  other 
words, participants may have a conscious intuitive feeling for which 
sequences follow a rule even though they cannot consciously access 
the basis of this feeling (Norman et al., 2007, 2010; Price & Norman,   
2008, 2009). 
AImS And deSIGn
In response to the methodological criteria outlined above, we con-
ducted an experiment which combines aspects of both the SRT and 
the AGL paradigms in a novel manner. The experiment measured 
implicit learning of sequences of pictures of body postures that were 
presented individually but followed an artificial grammar structure. As 
in traditional SRT tasks, the sequences could be taken to represent a AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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dynamic transformation of the state of a single entity (Suggestions 1 
and 2). But as in traditional AGL tasks, participants were exposed 
to a series of discrete exemplars of the sequence regularity, and se-
quences were not completely identical to each other (Suggestions 3 
and 4). The degree of learning was operationalised in terms of clas-
sification accuracy during a subsequent test phase where a series of 
novel  sequences  were  presented.  To  distinguish  between  noncon-
scious, intuitive and fully explicit learning, the study also included 
detailed  measurement  of  the  degree  of  conscious  awareness  of  ac-
quired knowledge as commonly applied within SRT and AGL tasks   
(Suggestion 5).
We used pictures of body movements as stimuli, rather than, for 
example, the traditional letter strings employed in the AGL task, in 
order to improve the ecological validity of the study for understand-
ing the role of implicit learning in social intuition. Our study therefore 
had similarities to the procedure recently used by Opacic, Stevens, and 
Tillmann (2009) who showed learning of sequences of body movement 
that followed an artificial grammar. Unlike Opapic et al. who presented 
participants with film sequences of modern dance, our stimuli were 
rapid  sequences  of  still  pictures.  Static  pictures  are  of  course  im- 
poverished stimuli compared to the continuous body movements of 
real life, but sequences of static pictures of body movements are known 
to still support the perception of human action (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007) 
and are therefore relevant to studying the detection of patterns of body 
movement.
Using sequences of static pictures which can follow the kinds of 
rules used in traditional AGL studies also allowed us, unlike in the 
study by Opapic et al., to directly compare sequence learning of pic-
torial body posture stimuli with sequence learning in a comparison 
condition where pictures were substituted by traditional letter stimuli. 
This allowed us to address the extent to which the learning of standard 
finite-state grammars used in AGL generalises from highly familiar 
verbal language stimuli to the domain of nonverbal social intuition. 
Whether participants were trained and tested on sequences of pictures 
of  body  postures  or  sequences  of  letters  was  a  between-subjects   
variable. 
Opacic et al. (2009) did not include detailed measures of what 
information  participants  were  consciously  aware  of  in  their  study. 
In addition to introducing these kinds of measures into a study of 
sequence learning with nonverbal social stimuli, our own study is 
therefore novel in allowing a measurement of whether this degree 
of awareness is modified by stimulus type. If sequence learning with 
pictorial body movement stimuli turned out to be considerably more 
explicit than learning with letter stimuli, this would caution the extent 
to which even our modified sequence learning procedures provide 
support for the kind of nonverbal socially-relevant implicit learning 
suggested by Lieberman (2000). On the other hand, the body move-
ment stimuli might be associated with a reduced tendency or ability 
to explicitly detect the sequence rule, suggesting that implicit learn-
ing is more robust in the nonverbal social domain than in sometimes 
controversial  studies  using  letter  strings  or  abstract  sequences  of   
dot positions.
method
Participants, stimuli, and apparatus
Fourty-eight students (mixed sex) aged 20-39 years (M = 23.1) took 
part for a small financial renumeration.
Letter strings containing five to nine letters were taken directly 
from a published artificial grammar study by Scott and Dienes (2008, 
Experiment 1). Grammatical letter strings followed one of two finite-
state grammars (Grammar A or Grammar B). There were 15 gram-
matical training strings for each grammar, and 30 grammatical test 
strings for each grammar (see Appendix A). The letters used were T, 
V, X, R, and M, written in black on a white background in Arial font.   
The letters were 2.8-3.4 cm wide and 3.7 cm high.
Body  movement  stimuli  were  five  photographs  of  a  person  in 
different yoga positions (see Appendix B). These were arranged into 
sequences following exactly the same pattern as for letter stimuli. In 
other words, each of the five letters was simply replaced by one of 
the five photographs. Photos were purchased from www.fotolia.com  
and their background colour was modified to full white with Adobe 
Photoshop. On screen these stimuli subtended 4.0-7.5 cm in width and 
8.8-13.5 cm in height.
The  experiment  was  programmed  in  E-prime  2.0  (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a, 2002b) on a Pentium 4 PC and dis-
played on a 19’’ Dell monitor at approximately 55 cm viewing distance. 
The experimenter gave a short introduction at the start of the experi-
ment. All subsequent instructions and rating materials were presented 
on screen. 
Procedure
training phase
Half the participants were assigned to view body posture stimuli 
and were informed that they would be presented with a number of 
yoga sequences that represented a new type of yoga called mosho. They 
were told to try and form an overall impression of the characterises of 
mosho-yoga. This will be referred to as the yoga condition. The other 
half of participants, in the letter condition, were told that they would be 
presented with a number of sequences of letters presented one at a time 
on the computer screen. To minimise conscious hypothesis-testing, all 
participants were told that the sequences would follow a pattern so 
complex that it was impossible to figure out consciously, and that they 
therefore should try to simply look at the sequences rather than search 
for a pattern.
The training phase consisted of three short blocks of 15 trials each. 
On each trial participants viewed a sequence of five to nine stimuli. 
Within the yoga and letter conditions, 12 participants viewed Gram-
mar A sequences and 12 were shown Grammar B sequences. On each 
block each of the 15 training sequences were presented in random 
order. There was a short self-paced break between each block. 
On each trial of the training phase, a central fixation cross was first 
presented for 1,000 ms, followed by a blank of 500 ms. Each sequence 
consisted of nine successive presentations of one screen display in each 
of nine positions on the screen. On the first display, a stimulus (letter or AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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body photo) was presented to the far left for 700 ms then removed. On 
the second display, an object was presented in the second position from 
the left for 700 ms then removed, and so on. For sequences that were 
shorter than nine stimuli, the last screen displays contained blanks   
of 700 ms duration.
test phase
At the start of the test phase, participants were informed that they 
would now be presented with a number of new sequences that they 
had not seen before. 
Participants in the yoga condition were told that half of the yoga se-
quences would follow the mosho style and for each presented sequence 
they would have to decide whether they thought it was mosho or not. 
They pressed a key marked “Yes” ([8] on the numeric keypad) if they 
thought the sequence followed the yoga pattern, and they pressed a key 
marked “No” ([2] on the numeric keypad) if they thought the sequence 
did not. Participants in the letter condition were told that half of the 
sequences would follow the same pattern as the training sequences and 
their task was to identify those sequences, responding as for the yoga 
condition.
All  participants  viewed  60  sequences  presented  in  one  block. 
Half of the sequences were novel Grammar A sequences, and half 
were  novel  Grammar  B  sequences.  Thus,  for  each  participant  half 
of  the  sequences  were  grammatical  and  the  remainder  were  non-
grammatical  according  to  the  grammar  on  which  they  had  been 
trained.  Presentation  and  timing  of  the  sequences  was  as  for  the 
training  phase.  The  order  in  which  sequences  were  presented  was   
randomised.
After each classification response, participants also had to indicate 
by a second key press whether they felt “Less confident” ([4] on the 
numeric keypad) or “More confident” ([6] on the numeric keypad). 
They were encouraged to distribute their responses evenly between the 
two categories to reduce response bias.
Participants then indicated the strategy they had used for their 
classification  response.  A  subset  of  the  categories  developed  by 
Scott and Dienes (2008) were used, namely Random choice (Key A), 
Familiarity (Key S), Intuition (Key D), Rules (Key F), and Memory 
(Key G). Response keys were clearly labelled with stickers. As part of 
the instructions the definitions of the various decision strategies were 
presented in writing on screen. The definitions were modified versions 
of those used by Scott and Dienes (2008) and were as follows: Random   
choice = the decision was completely random; Familiarity = the de-
cision was based on some aspect of the sequence feeling familiar or 
unfamiliar; Intuition = the decision was based on a feeling or hunch 
that you to some extent trusted, but which you could not explain the 
basis of; Rules = the decision was based on whether you thought the 
sequence followed or violated one or more rules which you could 
state if asked; Memory = the decision was based on explicit memory 
for the whole sequence or parts of it. Shortened definitions of each 
decision strategy were presented on screen during every trial until a 
response had been made. The participant had to press a key to initiate   
the next trial.
reSuLtS 
Mean classification accuracy, as measured by the proportion of trials on 
which a correct response was made, was significantly above the chance 
level of .5 both in the yoga condition, t(21) = 2.50, p = .02 (two-tailed), 
and in the letter condition, t(23) = 4.76, p < .001 (two-tailed). A 2 × 2 
ANOVA compared classification accuracy between these two condi-
tions and between participants trained on Grammars A or B. Since 
training on Grammar A versus B had no significant main effect (p = .45) 
and did not interact with the yoga/letter manipulation (p = .36), this 
variable  was  excluded  from  subsequent  analyses.  However,  mean 
classification accuracy was significantly higher in the letter condition   
(M = 0.59, SE = 0.02) than in the yoga condition (M = 0.53, SE = 0.01), 
F(1, 42) = 6.39, p = .02. 
Following Dienes and Scott (2005), trials were split into those at-
tributed to implicit decision strategies (i.e., to intuition, familiarity, or 
random choice), and those attributed to explicit decision strategies (i.e., 
rules or memory). The absolute distribution of implicit versus explicit 
responses (approximately 70% versus 30%) did not differ across stimu-
lus conditions, F(1, 44) = 1.52, p = .22. Overall, classification accuracy 
did not differ between trials attributed to implicit strategies (M = 0.56, 
SE = 0.01) and trials attributed to explicit strategies (M = 0.58, SE = 0.03), 
F(1, 41) = 0.26, p = .61. However, classification accuracy interacted 
significantly  between  stimulus  condition  and  decision  strategy,   
F(1, 41) = 10.75, p < .01 (see Figure 1). A post-hoc analysis (Fisher’s 
LSD test) showed that in the yoga condition there was a near-signifi-
cant trend (p = .07) for classification accuracy to be higher for implicit 
(M = 0.55, SE = 0.02) than for explicit responses (M = 0.47, SE = 0.04). 
The opposite pattern was found in the letter condition, where accuracy 
was significantly higher (p < .01) for explicit (M = 0.69, SE = 0.04) than 
for implicit responses (M = 0.58, SE = 0.02). A comparison across the 
two stimulus conditions showed that for implicit responses, classifica-
tion accuracy did not differ between the yoga and the letter condition 
(p = .43). However, for explicit responses, classification accuracy was 
significantly higher in the letter than in the yoga condition (p < .001). 
Comparison to chance (.5) showed that in the yoga condition, per-
formance was significantly above chance level for implicit responses, 
t(21) = 2.59, p = .02 (two-tailed). However, it was not different from 
chance level for explicit responses, t(19) = -0.82, p = .42 (two-tailed), 
where the mean difference score was numerically below chance. In the 
letter condition, classification accuracy was significantly above chance 
level for both explicit, t(22) = 4.89, p < .001 (two-tailed), and implicit 
responses, t(23) = 4.34, p < .001 (two-tailed). 
Classification  accuracy  was  significantly  higher  on  high-confi-
dence (M = 0.60, SE = 0.02) than on low-confidence trials (M = 0.53, 
SE = 0.01), F(1, 44) = 12.57, p < .001, but was above chance for both 
high-, t(45) = 5.48, p < .001 (two-tailed), and low-confidence trials, 
t(45) = 2.38, p = .02 (two-tailed). This pattern was not influenced by 
stimulus condition.
Note that the above analyses exclude two outlier participants in 
the yoga condition whose classification accuracy was more than two 
standard deviations above their group mean. When these participants AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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were included, the main effect of stimulus condition on overall clas-
sification  accuracy  failed  to  reach  significance  (p = .13). However, 
the significant interaction between stimulus condition and decision 
strategy remained significant, F(1, 43) = 7.45, p < .01. Even though the 
trend in the yoga condition for performance to be better for implicit 
than explicit responses was no longer present (p = .23), comparison 
of yoga performance to chance level showed the same pattern as be-
fore, with performance being significantly above chance for implicit,   
M = 0.55 , SE = 0.02, t(23) = 3.11, p < .01, but not for explicit responses, 
M = 0.51, SE = 0.04, t(21) = 0.15, p = .88. Classification accuracy re-
mained significantly better on high-confidence (M = 0.61, SE = 0.02) 
than on low-confidence trials (M = 0.54, SE = 0.01), F(1, 46) = 14.98,   
p < .001, and was still above chance for both high-confidence, t(47) = 5.82, 
p < .001 (two-tailed), and low-confidence trials, t(47) = 2.79, p < .01 
(two-tailed). This pattern was not influenced by stimulus condition.
dIScuSSIon
The amount of learning and the degree of consciousness over what was 
learned was explored in each of two experimental conditions (yoga 
sequences vs. letter sequences) in an implicit learning experiment that 
combined procedural aspects of both the SRT and AGL tasks. During 
training, participants viewed sequences of stimuli that followed a rule 
based structure. Several aspects of the general procedure and stimulus 
design were intended to improve the suitability of the implicit learn-
ing experiment as an analog of learning involved in social intuition, 
namely: (a) the dynamic nature of the sequences, in which sequence 
elements appeared one by one; (b) the presentation of each sequence 
as a discrete exemplar; (c) the use of varying sequences that adhered 
to an artificial grammar rule rather than using cyclic repetition of an 
identical sequence. In addition, our yoga stimulus condition, which 
consisted of sequences of body postures, used more socially natural-
istic stimuli than the letter sequences typically used in AGL tasks or 
the abstract shapes typically used in SRT tasks, and also depicted the 
transformation of a single entity (a body) rather than a juxtaposition 
of separate letters.
Participants in our yoga condition showed above chance learning 
of their artificial grammar. This complements the findings by Opacic et 
al. (2009) who showed learning of film sequences of body movement 
that followed an artificial grammar. 
Unlike Opapic et al., we compared learning of body movement 
with learning of more traditional letter string sequences. Participants 
who learned letter sequences actually classified novel sequences more 
accurately than participants who learned yoga sequences. This dif-
fers somewhat from the findings of Pothos, Chater, and Ziori (2006), 
who found no difference in the learning of artificial grammars when 
stimuli were either letter strings, arrangements of geometric shapes, or 
sequences of cities that corresponded to the routes of a travelling sales-
man. However, none of the stimulus conditions in the study of Pothos 
et al. were as complex as pictures of body posture, and it is possible 
that the increased complexity of our more naturalistic stimuli reduced 
sequence learning. More learning in the letter condition could also 
be explained in terms of differences in prior familiarity with the two 
types of stimuli. In an AGL task using novel geometrical symbols as 
stimuli, Scott and Dienes (2010) already showed that prior familiarisa-
tion with the symbols increased classification accuracy. However, the 
relative familiarity of letters versus other types of stimuli does not seem 
to have influenced relative performance in the study by Pothos et al. 
(2006). It should also be kept in mind that two high scoring outliers 
were dropped from the yoga condition in our study and without their 
exclusion the group difference we found would not reach significance. 
The most conservative interpretation of our data is therefore that, like 
others, we have been able to show that more naturalistic stimuli can 
yield at least some learning in studies of this kind. 
Our study included two measures of conscious awareness, namely 
confidence ratings and trial-by-trial evaluations of decision strategy. 
We found that the tendency of participants to attribute their clas-
sification responses to explicit decision strategies (rules or memory) 
on about 30% of trials, versus implicit decision strategies (intuition, 
familiarity, or random choice) on about 70% of trials, did not differ 
with stimulus type. However classification accuracy for trials attributed 
to implicit versus explicit strategies did show a significant interaction 
with stimulus type. A comparison within each experimental condition 
of relative classification accuracy for trials attributed to implicit versus 
explicit strategies can be used to draw inferences about the degree of 
! Figure 1.
Mean classification accuracy (+/- SE) for responses attributed to 
implicit versus explicit decision strategies, plotted separately for 
the yoga and control conditions with chance level (.5) indicated. 
Asterisks indicate where performance is significantly above chance 
level.
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conscious awareness of the learned sequence structure: If participants 
show higher classification accuracy for explicit than for implicit tri-
als, this suggests that an explicit approach, where participants apply 
conscious rules and memories, is more beneficial than an intuitive ap-
proach where they respond on the basis of familiarity, intuition, or ran-
dom choice. Such a pattern indicates that participants’ conscious rules 
and memories accurately reflect the sequence structure , that is, learn-
ing is associated with some conscious awareness of the sequence rule. 
However, if performance is better on implicit than on explicit trials, 
this suggests that participants have not developed accurate conscious 
structural knowledge of the rule set. In the current study we found that 
participants in the letter condition showed a significant tendency to 
perform better on trials attributed to explicit strategies than to implicit 
strategies, even though classification was above chance for both sub-
sets of trials. Participants in the yoga condition showed a trend in the 
opposite direction with classification accuracy only reaching signifi-
cantly above chance for implicitly attributed trials. For explicit trials, 
performance did not differ from chance, but the mean score was in fact 
slightly below chance level. This indicates that correct classification was 
mediated largely by implicit processing in the yoga condition but that 
at least some degree of explicit learning developed in the letter condi-
tion. Comparisons across stimulus conditions confirmed that partici-
pants in the letter condition showed an advantage over participants in 
the yoga condition for trials attributed to explicit, but not to implicit 
decision strategies. The overall picture that emerges from the current 
set of results indicates that sequences of body movements appear to be 
learned less explicitly than sequences of letters. 
Could the tendency for successful conscious hypothesis testing in 
the letter condition, as opposed to a more passive but still successful use 
of intuitive feelings in the yoga condition, be explained in terms of the 
two types of stimuli being associated with different levels of familiar-
ity? For example, more familiar stimuli may place less load on working 
memory, making it easier to intentionally examine the sequence struc-
ture. However, Scott and Dienes (2010) found that even though prior 
familiarisation with symbols increased overall classification accuracy in 
an AGL task, the influence of familiarity did not influence the relative 
proportion of responses attributed to implicit versus explicit strategies, 
and did not have a differential impact on classification accuracy during 
these two types of trials. Familiarity differences are therefore unlikely 
to explain the difference between our yoga and letter results.
Instead we suggest it is more likely that the interaction between 
stimulus condition and decision strategy is related to the visual versus 
verbal character and relative complexity of our two groups of stimuli. 
Sequences of separate letter stimuli can be categorised and rehearsed in 
working memory in terms of their well-learned verbal codes. However, 
sequences of body movements that now consist of apparent transfor-
mations of the same entity lack pre-existing verbal codes for each se-
quence item and will therefore be more difficult to explicitly memorise. 
This will leave less resources available for conscious hypothesis testing 
in the yoga than in a letter condition. The fact that participants in the 
yoga condition may distribute their attention across various aspects of 
their more complex stimuli, such as the face, hair, clothes and so on, 
will further reduce the ease with which sequence patterns can be de-
tected. Any conscious hypothesis-testing that they do engage in might 
even relate to stimulus aspects other than body posture. Classification 
judgements that are attributed to explicit rules or memory of specific 
stimulus characteristics are therefore likely to be based on spurious 
clues and performance will be poor on those trials. This might explain 
why participants in the yoga condition did not perform above chance 
on trials attributed to explicit strategies. When participants refrained 
from trying to use explicit knowledge, but just followed their intuitions 
as they might do in the real-life context of observing body movements, 
performance seemed better. This interpretation is consistent with find-
ings of Norman et al. (2007) who found that increasing the complexity 
of stimuli in the SRT task by adding random variation in the colour 
and shape of target stimuli seems to give rise to a less explicit and 
more implicit style of learning than reported in some previous studies 
(e.g., Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). Note that other studies have also 
investigated the effects of complexity on implicit learning by varying 
properties of the learned rule or by comparing performance under 
single versus dual task conditions (see Frensch, Buchner, & Lin, 1994; 
Frensch, Lin, & Buchner, 1998).
Since implicit decision strategies were defined to include not just 
intuition and familiarity but also random responses, it could be argued 
that the yoga participants’ advantage for implicit over explicit trials 
might derive from non-conscious orientation responses rather than 
from conscious feelings. In other words, their judgement knowledge 
(Dienes & Scott, 2005) may have been either non-conscious or con-
scious. One aspect of the data which may indicate that judgement 
knowledge was more conscious is that the relation of confidence rat-
ings to classification performance was equivalent in our yoga and letter 
conditions. What participants learned in the yoga condition is therefore 
best understood as a cognitive feeling (Price & Norman, 2008, 2009) 
− a variety of “fringe consciousness” where conscious feelings are ex- 
perienced and can be used to guide behaviour and judgements, includ-
ing confidence ratings, in the absence of full conscious awareness of 
the information-processing antecedents of those feelings (Norman et 
al., 2007, 2010; Price & Norman, 2008, 2009). Hence, the apparent dis-
crepancy between our decision strategy and confidence rating awareness 
measures − with the former but not the latter showing a modulation of 
explicit knowledge by stimulus condition − could well be related to the 
distinction between structural and judgement knowledge.
In conclusion, we have argued that sequence learning experiments 
can be constructed in a manner that simulates the properties of real-
world social learning environments better than traditional SRT and 
AGL paradigms, and we have shown that sequences based on artificial 
grammars can still be learned under these conditions. We have also 
found that the learning obtained under these conditions appears to be 
based more on explicit rule knowledge when sequence elements are 
letters, but based more on implicit intuitive feelings when elements are 
images of body posture. Perhaps the most important implication of 
our findings is that researchers of implicit learning may underestimate 
the possibility and real-world prevalence of truly implicit learning if 
they restrict themselves to using stimuli such as letter sequences or se-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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quences of simple geometrical shapes. Given the ongoing controversy 
over whether complex rules are learned via explicit knowledge of rule 
fragments (e.g., Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004), via conscious intuitions 
(e.g., Norman et al., 2007; Scott & Dienes, 2008), or entirely non- 
consciously (e.g., Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001), attention should 
also be given to the importance of stimulus materials. Further research 
is now needed to identify the relative importance of stimulus complex-
ity per se versus the extent to which stimuli are naturalistic and socially 
relevant.
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AppendIx A 
Letter strings
training strings: grammar a
XMMXM
XXRVTM
VVTRVM
VTTTTVM
XMMMMXM
XXRTVTM
XMXRTVTM
XXRTTTVM
XMMXRTVM
VTVTRVTM
VVTRTTVTM
VTTTVTRVM
XMXRTTTVM
XMMMXRVTM
XMMMXRTVM
test strings: grammar a
VTVTM   
XXRVM   
VTTTVM   
VTTVTM   
XMMMXM   
XMXRVM   
VTTTVTM   
VTVTRVM   
VVTRVTM   
XMMXRVM   
XMXRTVM   
XXRTTVM   
VTTTTVTM   
VTTVTRVM   
VTVTRTVM   
VVTRTVTM   
XMMMXRVM 
XMXRTTVM   
XXRTTVTM   
XXRVTRVM   
VTTTVTRVM 
VTTVTRTVM 
VTVTRTTVM 
VTVTRTVTM 
VVTRTTVTM 
XMMXRTTVM 
XMXRTTVTM 
XMXRVTRVM 
XXRTTTVTM 
XXRTVTRVM 
training strings: grammar b
XXRRM
VVRXRM
XXRRRM
VTRRRRM
VVTRXRM
XMVTRXM
VVRXRRRM
VVTRXRRM
XMVRMTRM
XMVTRMTM
VVTTTRMTM
VVTTTRXRM
XMVRMTRRM
XMVTRMTRM
XMVTTRMTM
test strings: grammar b
VTRRM   
XMTRM   
VTRRRM   
VVRMTM   
XMTRRM   
XMVRXM   
VVRMTRM   
VVRXRRM   
VVTRMTM   
XMTRRRM   
XMVRMTM   
XMVRXRM   
VTRRRRRM   
VVRMTRRM   
VVRMVRXM 
VVTTRMTM   
VVTTRXRM   
XMVRXRRM 
XMVTRXRM   
XMVTTRXM   
VVRMVRXRM 
VVRMVTRXM 
VVTRMTRRM 
VVTRMVRXM 
VVTRXRRRM 
VVTTRMTRM 
VVTTRXRRM 
XMVRMVRXM 
XMVRXRRRM 
XMVTRXRRMAdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2012 • volume 8(2) • 121-131 131
AppendIx b 
Picture stimuli
Figure b1.
letter M. Photo purchased from www.fotolia.com
Figure b2.
letter R. Photo purchased from www.fotolia.com
Figure b5.
letter X. Photo purchased from www.fotolia.com
Figure b4.
letter V. Photo purchased from www.fotolia.com
Figure b3.
letter T. Photo purchased from www.fotolia.com